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Reasons to Care about Reasons for Action:
A Response to Paul S. Davies
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Vanderbilt University
In eschewing the specialty-standards of neuro-babble and philosophical 
neologism, Paul S. Davies (2016) argues with courageous clarity.  He 
connects issues in neuroscience and epistemology to problems surrounding 
agency.  I agree with many of his claims, but I think they need more 
context and precision for application.  This is because his argument as it 
stands now affects only a limited set of theories, and a hidden modality in 
thesis 3 tempers his argument further.  And perhaps most urgently, if his 
theory fails to address “top-down”1 mental processes or social dimensions 
of knowledge, his argument fails to meet even his own goals set out in the 
paper.
1. Questioning First-personal Reasons: Ethics, Law, and Neuroscience
Davies argues for a “modest form of skepticism regarding our knowledge 
of our reasons for acting” (2016, p. 135).  If successful, his argument 
challenges the justifi catory status of fi rst-personal reasons for action.
However, this fi rst-personal focus on reasons affects only a limited 
subset of theories.  For example, Davies’ argument frustrates normative 
systems that rely on rationality as the justifying or principle capacity. 
Davies chips the veneer of intellectualistic theories, like Kantian 
constructivism (given its dependence on self-legislating reason) or Stoic 
rationality (given that reason regulates the mind to achieve tranquility 
against the body, passions, and world).
But other theories take no damage at all.  If a theory does not rely 
on reasons for action as fundamental, then it avoids Davies’ claims. 
Normatively, a holistic Aristotelian virtue ethics, a Humean theory of 
sentiments, or a Rossian intuitionistic deontology could parry Davies’ 
thrust (see: Hursthouse, 1999; Slote, 2010; Ross, 2002).  Descriptively, 
moral psychologist like Jonathan Haidt (2001) already make similar attacks 
on rationality, agreeing that reason is often used in a rationalization of our 
gut reactions after we act, not as a premeditated account of our actions. 
His paper confi rms the suspicion that many ethicists and psychologists 
already feel about myopic focus on rationality.
Additionally, the focus on fi rst-personal reasons neglects third-
personal ascriptions of reasons for action.  For example, in law, courts 
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do not rely on a person’s ability to give fi rst-personal accounts.  Even in 
crimes of fi rst degree murder, a defendant does not need to confess to a 
crime or give certain reasons to be convicted.  The reasons ascribed to a 
defendant by the jury can meet legal burdens of proof to justify conviction. 
Moreover, advocates of restorative justice might focus on more agent-
neutral or systemic considerations to amend injustice, thus making no 
appeal to fi rst-personal reasons whatever.
Even neuroscience itself, the fi eld providing the bulk of Davies’ 
evidence, does not rely on fi rst-personal accounts of reasons for action. 
Brain imaging technologies aim at fi nding an impartial, third-personal 
way to observe the mind.  Current technologies can measure the rough 
emotional or affective states that underlie a decision or action.  And maybe 
rough states of mind are adequate for most enterprises.  Pragmatic, clear-
enough reasons can be tested against predictability, diachronic consistency, 
explanatory power, or success in achieving practical goals.  The sciences 
have long progressed without philosophical certainty or justifi ed, true 
belief.  Neuroscience does not need Knowledge to proceed, only testable 
hypotheses.
I admire Davies’ paper because it transcends mere academic worry, 
and I think his theory packs a punch.  But my preliminary comments show 
its limited reach.  With some footwork, he could jab at certain moral, legal, 
or scientifi c domains, but he would need to specify (a) what reasons are, 
(b) how clear reasons need to be for different disciplines, and (c) who 
exactly this argument targets.
2. Challenging the Autonomy of Mind in Theses 2 and 3
My second comment addresses theses 2 and 3 in Davies’ argument.  Davies 
structures it as a hypothetical syllogism, so if one part of the chain is 
broken, the conclusion does not hold.  He argues roughly: if thesis 3 about 
human neurobiology is true, then it shows how limited our knowledge of 
our reasons for action is, proving thesis 2.  And if thesis 2 is true, then we 
must accept some form of skepticism as in thesis 1 (2016, pp. 135-136). 
Alternatively: if neuroscience can show that at least one signifi cant neural 
process prevents our conscious, attentive mind from knowing our reasons 
for action, then we must hold a modest form of skepticism regarding our 
own reasons for action.
Davies’ main support for our neurobiological limits is his 
characterization of an autonomous, endogenous, ancestral mind.  I 
question, though, the strength of the autonomy ascribed to it.  The relevant 
claim I want to challenge is Davies’ assertion:
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So the case of Heather Joy, as well as the cases described by 
Shewmon, vividly illustrate that we are born with endogenous, 
autonomous affective systems.  The effects of these systems 
are not acquired via learning and they operate in the absence 
of cortical input.  It’s as if our mid- and lower-brain structures 
comprise a free-standing mind unto itself.  Panksepp refers to it 
as our ancient mammalian brain. (2016, p. 141)
I take issue with two things here.  First, I think there is a hidden modal 
operator determining the scope of the autonomy.  Instead of claiming 
that sub-cortical systems simply do operate autonomously, the argument 
should claim that it is biologically possible for human sub-cortical 
systems to operate autonomously.  Empirical evidence abounds, not only 
in Davies’ examples, but in the cases of patients in persistent vegetative 
states who still react to foot scrapes, and in patients who lead normal lives, 
despite missing large portions of their brains.2  So, I agree that sub-cortical 
structures in the human brain can function autonomously in at least some 
cases.
However, the challenge of using cases like split-brain, anencephalic, 
persistently vegetative, or neuro-developmentally atypical patients is 
drawing an analogy from them to full agents.  This is my second issue.  In 
the same way that biologists cannot apply all the insights from zebrafi sh 
or mice to human biology, philosophers must exercise caution when 
extrapolating from neuro-atypical patients to full agents.  Just because 
parts of the human brain can function autonomously does not indicate 
how autonomous these parts of the brain must be in more species-typical 
patients.  Diffi culties compound when considering the plasticity of the 
mind as well.  So, while split-brain, anencephalic, or developmentally 
challenged patients illuminate how some persons think, they may not 
clarify how full agents think.  It is plausible that lessons learned from them 
will not strictly apply to the epistemically virtuous or the fully morally 
responsible.
3. The Moral Importance of “Top-Down” Processes, and Friends
The real issue, however, is that philosophers have never disputed the fact 
that parts of the mind seem autonomous when allowed to run freely.  We 
resort to our animal natures when uneducated.  This is why Aristotle turns 
to human souls only after addressing plant and animal souls (1984, 413a23 
ff., 432a15 ff.), and why he painstakingly dissects competing faculties of 
the mind and akrasia (2002, bks. VI-VII).  More famously, Plato envisions 
the human mind as a chariot with one good horse and one bad horse pulling 
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in different directions (1997a, 246a-b).  No one denies the existence 
of the bucking, vicious horse, an analog for the sub-cortical processes 
associated with the endogenous, ancestral mind in Davies’ argument.  The 
disagreement is about whether the charioteer—intellect or reason-giving 
capacities—can rein it in.
This is why “top-down” processes are important to address.  If reason 
(likely some cortical process in the conscious, attended mind) can affect, 
regulate, or train the subcortex, then it can maintain its executive status. 
Sub-cortical processes need not be perfectly transparent to the agent; the 
charioteer does not need to know the mind of the vicious horse.  But, 
reason needs to be able to regulate sub-cortical processes; the charioteer 
needs to be able to train the vicious horse to trot on command.  Relatedly, 
in the presence of such a charioteer, the horse might not be autonomous 
in the sense necessary for this argument to have its greatest impact. 
Davies needs to address how functions of the cerebral cortex interact with 
subcortex, especially the executive functions of the prefrontal cortex and 
the theory of mind functions of the temporoparietal junction.  Without 
this, the argument relies on a hidden assumption: the cortex always 
insuffi ciently regulates the subcortex.
Also, for the skepticism to hold more securely, the fi rst-personal 
restriction merits expansion.  Over-emphasizing the fi rst-personal 
knowledge of reasons for action belies the social nature of moral life 
and information.  This is why Plato’s Republic repeatedly emphasizes 
education while defi ning justice (1997b, bks. III-IV, VII), and why, to 
defi ne virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle spends one book on 
justice and two on friendship (2002, bks. V, VIII-IX).  Others, especially 
friends, have privileged epistemic access to evaluating some of our actions, 
and they help us to cultivate virtue.  Moreover, we can use our interactions 
with others to discover our own internal moral principles or reasons for 
action.  Aristotle even goes so far as to argue that we love others as we 
love ourselves (2002, 1161a1 ff., 1169b34-5).  There is a strong parallel 
between others and ourselves in moral psychology and knowledge.  And 
when we observe them and they us, we learn new things about ourselves.
My three comments ask Davies to expand his argument.  Thesis 1 
sets out that he wants the skepticism to hold in “some non-trivial range 
of conditions” (2016, p. 135).  That burden might not be met without 
addressing the ways the cerebral cortex can affect lower brain structures, 
and without addressing the social nature of morality.  However, if Davies 
can show (a) the cerebral cortex cannot regulate the subcortex and (b) 
third-personal perspectives do not ascribe suffi ciently accurate reasons 
for action, then every normative theory will need to regard the empirical 
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literature more seriously.
Notes
1 I use “top-down” to refer to cortical processes affecting sub-cortical 
processes.  I do not use it as Davies does when citing Dehaene’s “top-down 
attention mechanism” (2016, p. 136).  I use “subcortex” and “sub-cortical” to 
refer to non-cortical parts of the brain most broadly.  Throughout, I do not mean 
to identify the mind with the brain in a strict form of eliminative materialism.  My 
argument needs only that some states of mind depend on some brain regions.
2 See, for example: Yu et. al. (2014, pp. e1-e5).  They review a case of a 
24-year-old woman leading a life of relative normalcy—married, mother to a child, 
integrated with her family.  However, after going to the hospital complaining of 
dizziness, physicians diagnosed her with “mild mental retardation and cerebellar 
ataxia” (2014, p. e3), fi nding her cerebellum never developed and many areas of 
her brain were more cerebrospinal fl uid than brain tissue.  See also: Feuillet et.  al 
(2007, p. 262).  They describe the case of a 44-year-old man—married, father of 
two, employed as a civil servant.  Complaining of leg weakness, he went to the 
hospital, and brain scans revealed “severe dilation of the lateral ventricles” and 
“a very thin cortical mantle and a posterior fossa cyst” (2007, p. 262).  The scans 
showed that most of his brain was cerebrospinal fl uid.
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